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ABSTRACT
Data Security has become a very serious part of any organizational information system. Internet threats
have become more intelligent so it can deceive the basic security solutions such as firewalls and antivirus
scanners. To enhance the overall security of the network an additional security layer such as intrusion
detection system (IDS) has to be added. The anomaly detection IDS is a type of IDS that can differentiate
between normal and abnormal in the data monitored. This paper proposes two types of IDS, one of them
can be used as a network intrusion detection system (NIDS) with overall success (0.9161) and high
detection rate (0.9288) and the other type can also be used as a host intrusion detection system (HIDS) with
overall success (0.8493) and very high detection rate (0.9628) using NSL-KDD data set.
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1.INTRODUCTION
In the age of information technology revolution the telecommunications networks have been
developed from circuit switched network to packet switched network, after that it has Mutations
enormous towards all-IP based networks. These developments make the communication of
applications and services such as data and voice are being transferred on top of the IP-protocol
[1].
The development of data transmission speeds in both uplink and downlink has increased
considerably from the second generation (2G) of radio access networks to the third generation
(3G) of radio access networks and the development of devices that subscribers of
telecommunications networks make the boundary between computers and mobile phones has
become unspecified.
With the smart phones, the subscriber can do almost everything and can dispense on the basic
personal computers. This means that the full data on the Internet is now in the hands of each
smart phone owners. Technologies in communications networks have become more progress and
it has raised new unwanted possibilities. Risks and threats that were applicable only in the fixed
networks are now feasible in the radio access networks. The security systems have to become
more intelligent because of threats are becoming more advanced.
The basic security measurements such as firewalls and antivirus scanners cannot keep pace with
the overgrowing number of intelligent attacks from the Internet. A solution to enhance the overall
security of the networks is to add an additional security layer to increase the security layers by
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using intrusion detection systems (IDS). Intrusion Detection System (IDS) designed to
complement other security measures based on attack prevention [2]. Amparo Alonso-Betanzos et
al. [3] say ‘The aim of the IDS is to inform the system administrator of any suspicious activities
and to recommend specific actions to prevent or stop the intrusion’.
There are two types of intrusion detection, one of them is signature- based and the other is
anomaly-based intrusion detection. The signature-based or misuse detection method use patterns
of well-known attacks to identify intrusions [4].
The anomaly-based intrusion detection uses network traffic which has been monitored and
compared versus any deviation from the established normal usage patterns to determine whether
the current state of the network is anomalous. An anomalous traffic can considered as intrusion
attempt.
Misuse detection uses well-defined patterns known as signatures of the attacks. Anomaly-based
detection builds a normal profile and anomalous traffic detected when the deviation from the
normal model reaches a preset threshold level [5].
The anomaly-based intrusion detection depends on features selection. Well selection of features
will maintain accuracy of the detection while speeding up its calculations. Therefore, any
reduction in the number of features used for the detection will improve the overall performance of
the IDS. If there are no useless features, focus on the most important ones expected to improve
the execution speed of IDS.
This increase in the detection speed will not affect accuracy of the detection in a significant way.
Incorrect selection of the features may reduce the speed of the operation and reduce detection
accuracy [6].
This aim of this paper is to improve the intrusion detection system by using Principal Component
Analysis as a dimension reduction technique. The Paper Compares between two different features
selections, i.e.6 features and 10 features. One of this features selections can be used in Network
Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) and the other can be used in Host Intrusion Detection System
(HIDS).
2.RELATIVE WORK
Chakraborty [7] has reported that the existence of irrelevant and redundant features generally
affects the performance of machine learning part of the work. Chakraborty proved that good
selection of the feature set results in better classification performance.
A. H. Sung et al. [8] have demonstrated that the elimination of these unimportant and irrelevant
features did not reduce the performance of the IDS.
Chebrolu et al. [9] reported that an important advantage of combining redundant and
complementary classifiers is to increase accuracy and better overall generalization. Chebrolu et al.
[9] have also identified important input features in building IDS that are computationally efficient
and effective. This work shows the performance of three feature selection algorithms: (1)
Bayesian networks, (2) Classification and Regression Trees and (3) an ensemble of Bayesian
networks and Classification and Regression Trees.
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Sung and Mukkamala [8], have explored SVM and Neural Networks that can categorize features
with respect to their importance. Use SVM and Neural Networks to detect specific kinds of
attacks such as probing, DoS, Remote to Local, and User to Root. Prove that the elimination of
less importance and irrelevant features has no effect on reducing the performance of the IDS.
Chebrolu et al. [9] suggested CART-BN approach, where CART has a better performance for
Normal, Probe and U2R and the ensemble approach worked has a better performance for R2L and
DoS. Meanwhile, A. Abraham et al. [10] proved that ensemble of Decision Tree was suitable for
Normal, LGP for Probe, DoS and R2L and Fuzzy classifier was good for R2L attacks.
A. Abraham et al. [11] prove the ability of their suggested on Ensemble structure in modelling
lightweight distributed IDS.
Manasi Gyanchandani et al. [12] improved the performance of C4.5 classifier over NSL-KDD
dataset using different classifier combinations techniques such as bagging, boosting and stacking.
Gholam Reza Zargar et al. [2] show that dimension reduction and identification of effective
network features for category-based selection can reduce the processing time in an intrusion
detection system while maintaining the detection accuracy within an acceptable range.
3. MULTIVARIATE STATISTICAL ANALYSIS
3.1 Distance
Many multivariate techniques applied to the anomaly detection problem are based upon the
concept of distances. The most familiar distance metric is the Euclidean or straight-line distance.
In most cases, it is used as a measure of similarity in the nearest neighbour method. Let x = (x1,
x2, x3, …, xp) ´ and y = (y1, y2, y3, …, yp) ´ be two p-dimensional observations, the Euclidean
distance between x and y is
d2 (x, y) = (x − y)′ (x − y) (1)
Since each feature contributes equally to the calculation of the Euclidean distance, this distance is
undesirable when different features measured on different scales or the features have very
different variability. The effect of the features that have high variability or large scales of
measurement would control others that have less variability or smaller scales. As an alternative, a
measure of variability can be incorporated into the distance metric directly. One of these metrics
is the well-known Mahalanobis distance
d 2 (x, y) = (x − y)′ S−1 (x − y) (2)
Where S is the sample covariance matrix.
3.2 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
Naturally in intrusion detection problems Data found in high dimensions. To easily explore the
data and further analysis, the dimensionality of the data must be reduced. The PCA is often used
for this purpose. PCA is a predominant linear dimensionality reduction technique, and it has been
widely applied to datasets in many different scientific domains [13].
PCA is concerned with explaining the variance covariance structure of a set of variables through a
few new variables, which are linear combinations of the original variables. Principal components
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are particular linear combinations of the p random variables {x1, x2, x3, …, xp} with three
important properties. The first one is the principal components are uncorrelated. The second one
is the first principal component has the highest variance and the second principal component has
the second highest variance and so on. The third one is the total variation in all the principal
components combined equal to the total variation in the original variables {X1, X2, X3, …, Xp }.
The new variables with such properties are easily obtained from eigenanalysis of the covariance
matrix or the correlation matrix of {X1, X2, X3, …, Xp } [14]. Let the original data X be a n x p
data matrix of n observations on each of p variables (X1, X2, …, Xp) and let R be a p x p sample
correlation matrix of X1, X2 , …, Xp. If (λ1, e1), (λ2, e2), (λ3, e3), … (λp, ep) are the p eigenvalue
and eigenvector Pairs of the matrix R, λ ≥ λ ≥λ ≥ … ≥ λ ≥ 0, then ith sample principal
component of an observation vector x= (x1, x2, x3, …, xp) ʹ is
yi = e′i z
yi = ei1z1 + ei2 z2 + ei3z3 +...+ eip zp , i =1,2,3,.., p (3)
Wheree = (e , e , e ,..., e )′ is the ith eigenvector.
And
Z = (z , z2, z3, …, zp ) is the vector of standardized observations defined asz = x − x , k=1, 2, 3, ..., p (4)
Where x is the sample mean of the variable x . The ith principal component has sample variance
λ and the sample covariance or correlation of any pair of principal components is equal to zero.
The PCA produces a set of independent variables so the total variance of a sample is the sum of
all the variances accounted for by the principal components. The correlation between any two
variables isρ , = ( , ) (5)
Where σ is the standard deviation of x which is a sample of data. The principal components of
the sample correlation matrix have the same properties as principal components from a sample
covariance matrix. As all principal components are uncorrelated, the total variance in all of the
principal components isλ + λ +⋯+ λ = p (6)
The principal components produced by the covariance matrix are different from the principal
components produced by the correlation matrix. Eigenvalues have larger weights because of some
values are much larger than others. Since The NSL-KDD data set has many items with varying
scales and ranges so the correlation matrix will use.
3.3 Applying PCA to Outlier Detection
PCA applied as an outlier detection method. In applying PCA, there are two main issues, (1) how
to interpret the set of principal components and (2) how to calculate the notion of distance. First,
each eigenvalue of a principal component corresponds to the relative amount of variation it
encompasses. The larger the eigenvalue is the more significant its corresponding projected
eigenvector should be. Therefore, the most significant principal components sorted before the
least significant principal components. If a new data item projected along the upper set of the
significant principal components, it is likely that the data item can be classified without projecting
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along all of the principal components. Second, the data sample can represent by the axes of
eigenvectors of the principal components. Those axes considering a normal when the data sample
is the training set of normal network connections. If any points lie outside these axes by far
distance then the data connection would exhibit abnormal data connection.
Outliers measured using the Mahalanobis distance are presumably network connections that are
anomalous, any network connection with a distance greater than the threshold value (t) is
considered an outlier. In this work, any outlier represents an attack. Consider the sample principal
components of an y , y , … , y observation x where
yi = e′i z , i =1,2,... , pz = x − x , k=1, 2, 3, ..., p
The sum of scores that are squares of the partial principal component is equal to the principal
component score∑ = + +⋯+ (7)
Equating to the Mahanobolis distance of the observation X from the mean of the normal sample
data set [15].
Anomaly detections Needs an offline training or learning phase whether those methods are outlier
detection, statistical models, or association rule mining. PCA has two clearly separate phases (the
offline and online detection phases). These two separate phases are an advantage for hardware
implementation. Another advantage of PCA is reduction of features. As we will show in our
experiment, PCA effectively reduces the number of processed features from 41 to 10 or 6
features.
The outline steps involved in PCA are shown in (figure 1). Training data take as input and a mean
vector of each sample calculate in the offline phase. Ideally, these data sets are a snapshot of
activity connections in a real network environment. In addition, these data sets should contain
only normal connections. Second, correlation matrixes calculate from the training data.
A correlation matrix normalizes all of the data by calculating the standard deviation. Next,
eigenanalysis performed on the correlation matrix to create independent orthonormal eigenvalue
and eigenvector pairs. The set of principal components can use in online analysis because of these
pairs. Finally, the sets of principal components sort by eigenvalue in descending order. The
eigenvalue is a relative measure of the variance of its corresponding eigenvectors.
Using dimensionality-reducing method such as PCA to extract the most significant principal
components, so only a subset of the most important principal components needs to classify any
new data. In addition to using the most significant principal components (q) to find intrusions, we
have found that it is helpful to look for intrusions along a number of least-significant components
(r) as well.
The major principal component score calculated by the most significant principal components and
the minor principal component score calculated by the less significant principal components.
Major principal component score (MajC) is used to detect severe deviations with large values of
the original features. These observations follow the correlation structure of the sample data.
Minor principal component score (MinC) is used to detect attacks may not follow the same
correlation model. In this work, two thresholds needed to detect attacks. If the principal
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components sorted in descending order, then (q) is a subset of the highest values and is a subset of
the smallest components. The MajC threshold is referred (t ) while the MinC threshold is
referred to (t ). An observation (x) is an attack if
∑ > t Or ∑ > t (8)
The online portion takes major principal components and minor principal components and maps
online data into the eigenspace of those principal components
Figure (1) PCA For Network Intrusion Detection
4. EXPERIMENT
4.1 Data Set Description
Mostly all the experiments on intrusion detection are done on KDDCUP ’99 dataset, which is a
subset of the 1998 DARPA Intrusion Detection Evaluation data set and is processed extracting
41 features from the raw data of DARPA 98 data set. Defined higher level features that help in
differentiating between “good” normal connections from “bad” attacks connections [16].
KDDCUP 99 data set can be used in host-based systems, network-based systems, signature
systems and anomaly detection systems.
A connection is a sequence of Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) packets starting and ending
with the time between which data come from a source IP address to a target IP address under
some protocol. Each connection described as a normal or as an attack with defined the attack
type. Each connection record consists of about 100 bytes [17].
KDD train and test set contains a huge number of records and huge number of redundant
records. Almost about 78% and 75% of the records duplicated in the train and test set
respectively. The classification will be wrong because of these redundant records and thus these
records prevent classifying the other records that is not redundant. To solve this problem, a new
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dataset was developed NSL-KDD [18]. One copy of each repeated record was not removed in
the KDD train and test set.
4.2 Performance Measures
Metrics, which are mainly used to evaluate the performance of classifiers are presented in [19],
[20] and are given here for ready reference.
• The true positives (TP) are correct classifications and true negatives (TN) are correct
classifications. True positive is the probability that there is an alert, when there is an intrusion.
• A false negative (FN) occurs when the outcome is incorrectly predicted as negative when it is
actually positive.
• The true positive rate (TPR) is computed asTPR = (9)
• A false positive (FP) occurs when the outcome is incorrectly predicted positive when it is
actually negative. The false positive rate computes asFPR = (10)
• Recall: The percentage of the total relevant documents in a database retrieved by your search
computes asrecall = (11)
• Precision: The percentage of relevant documents in relation to the number of documents
retrieved is calculated asprecision = (12)
• The overall success rate is the number of correct classifications divided by the total number of
classifications is calculated assuccess rate = (13)error rate = 1 − success rate (14)
4.3 Experiment steps and results
In our experiments we use KDDTrain_20Percent [21] in both the training and testing stages.
The KDDTrain_20Percent contain 25192 connections records. The training data sets contain
records of network connections labelled either as normal or as an attack. Each connection record
made up of 41 different features related to the connection.
The 41 features are divided into three categories: basic features of TCP connections (1) ,
content features of the connection (2) , and traffic features (3) which are derived using a 2-s
time window to monitor the relationships between connections. The same service and the same
host information are included in The traffic-level features such as the number of connections in
the past 2 s that have the same destination host as the current connection.
First, we select 6 features from the basic features of TCP connections which used with NIDS
because these features do not need any host logs. Second, we add 4 features from traffic
features, which based on time window and this collection (10 features), used in HIDS is shown
in (Table 1).
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Table 1 Feature Used in Our Experiment
Feature name Description Type
Duration Number of seconds of the connection Continuous (1)
Protocol Type Type of the protocol, e.g. tcp, udp, icmp . Discrete (1)
Service Network service on the destination, e.g., http,telnet, https, etc Discrete (1)
Src-bytes Number of data bytes from source to destination Continuous (1)
Dst-bytes Number of data bytes from destination to source Continuous (1)
Flag Normal or error status of the connection Discrete (1)
Count Number of connections from the same source asthe current connection in the past two seconds Continuous (3)
Sev-count
Number of connections to the same service as the
current connection in the past two seconds from
the same source
Continuous (3)
Dst-host-count Number of connections to the same host as the
current connection in the past two seconds Continuous (3)
Dst-host-srv-count
Number of connections to the same service as the
current connection in the past two seconds to the
same host
Continuous (3)
We used a Matlab program to design our IDS. Based on [22], we suggest using (q) major
components that can explain about 50 - 70 percents of the total variation in the standardized
features. When the original features are uncorrelated, each principal component from the
correlation matrix has an eigenvalue equal to 1. So the minor components are those components
whose variances or eigenvalues are less than 0.20, which would indicate some relationships
among the features (r).
First step we selected 6 features and suggested using q = 3, r =0. Second step we added 4 features
and suggested using q= 3, r =2. In a multiclass prediction, the result on a test set is often
displayed as a two dimensional confusion matrix with a row and a column for each class.
Each matrix element shows the number of test examples for which the actual class is the row and
the predicted class is the column. Good results correspond to large numbers down the main
diagonal and small, ideally zero, off-diagonal elements. The confusion Matrix is showed on the
(Table 2). The Performance Measures are shown in (Table 3) and (Table 4).
Table 2 Confusion Matrix
Predicted Class
Actual
Class
Attack Normal
Attack TP FN
Normal FP TN
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Table.3 Detection Attacks In All Steps
Attacks DOS PROBE R2l U2r
Exist 9234 2289 209 11
Detection from
step (1) 8666 2212 28 1
Detection from
step (2) 9028 2244 32 2
Table 4 metrics for all steps
Step (1) Step (2)
Metrics Normal
class
Anomaly
class
Normal
class
Anomaly
class
Recall and
TPR 0.9050 0.9288 0.7503 0.9628
FPR 0.0712 0.0949 0.0372 0.2496
Precision 0.9357 0.8952 0.9584 0.7719
Overall
success
0.9161 0.8493
Error 0.0839 0.1507
Both recall and precision have good value in these two steps but one of steps can be used as NIDS
another can be used as HIDS which has a better detection rate.
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Future network intrusion detection system generation will most likely employ both signature
detection and anomaly detection modules. Anomaly detection methods process a large amount of
data in order to recognize anomalous behaviour or new attacks.
This paper used PCA as an effective way of outlier analysis. PCA is particularly useful because of
its ability to reduce data dimensionality into a smaller set of independent variables from which
new data can be classified.
This paper has two steps in its experiment. The first step takes six features from the basic features
of TCP connections that can used in NIDS and this step has an overall success rate (0.9161) with
high detection rate (0.9288). The second step takes ten features {six features from the basic
features of TCP connections plus four features from traffic features} which can be used in HIDS
and this step has an overall success rate (0.8493) with very high detection rate for Anomaly class
(0.9628).
Plan for the future work is to use these two steps to make an integrated intrusion detection system
by using relationship between these two steps.
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